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In chapter 1, I developed the rudiments of a simple model of a con-
sumer's demand for medical care, conditional on the level of health
physicians had led him to expect to result. In this chapter, I shall ex-
amine in much more detail how consumer expectations are formed.
If consumers always believed all that physicians told them, and ac-
cepted advice unquestioningly, then the only constraint on movement
to that level of demand which would maximize physician income—
probably a very high level of demand indeed—would be the moral
scrupulousness of physicians. The physician's attitude toward truth-
telling, or "accuracy" as I shall call it hereafter, can be shown to be an
important influence on a consumer's use of care and on health levels,
but it may not be the only influence. In particular, consumers can con-
trol the effect of physician-provided information on their behavior by
deciding, within some limits, both how to react to advice and which
physicians to patronize for advice. In some emergencies, the consumer
does not of course have these options. But the bulk of medical encoun-
ters are not of this sort, and even in many situations labeled "emer-
gency" the consumer has in principle a considerable amount of power
over what can be done to him (including whether or not he chooses to
be an "emergency" case) and which physician he chooses in order to
obtain advice.
In view of recent questioning of the appropriateness of medical advice
and medical decisions from such diverse parties as Ivan Illich
1 and the
U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi-
gations,
2 it seems appropriate to determine whether a more analytical
approach to the question can make a contribution. As will soon become
apparent, even a designedly simple approach to modeling the problem
soon becomes quite complicated.
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What will determine how a consumer will react to physician advice?
Intuitively, one might suppose that the stronger a person's prior beliefs,
the less he will respond to the information provided. Unfortunately, this
conjecture is incorrect in general for reasonable measures of "strength
of beliefs." But it is still possible to show that for some sufficiently high
level of prior certainty, this conclusion will follow. Thus there is a theo-
retical basis for the empirical expectation that those spending units
characterized by a sufficiently high level of a priori information will,
other things being equal, be less responsive to changes in information
obtained.
The model is one in which the consumer's demand for medical care
is conditional on the content of the advice. There are two critical ques-
tions to be addressed: (1) What determines from which physician he
will seek advice? (2) What determines how the consumer will respond
to the advice? Corresponding to each of these aspects of demand, there
is an appropriate supply response: first, the content of the advice each
physician decides to provide; and second, the overall content of advice
physicians choose. In what follows I will examine each of these deci-
sions.
The Consumer's Demand for Medical Care
The approach here is first to develop a simple model of the consumer's
demand for medical care under certainty, then introduce uncertainty
but with information unavailable, and finally to show the consequences
of permitting information to become available. One possible aspect of
behavior that will not be incorporated here is a possible consumer suspi-
cion, based solely on the content of the advice received, that the physi-
cian is willfully not providing accurate information. In the model to be
discussed, the physician may lie, and the consumer may not believe him,
but consumers do not believe that physicians individually or collectively
lie on purpose; physicians are only supposed to make honest mistakes.
It is assumed that the consumer has a single period utility function in
health H and other goods x. The intertemporal aspects of the choice of
health levels and of the production process for health, which have been
treated extensively by Grossman,
3 will be ignored here. Likewise the
time cost of obtaining health will be ignored. As in chapter 1, the utility
function is
(1) U=U(x,H)
The composite good x is available at a price of unity, but health must
be produced. The production function for health is
(2) H = g(M,H0)45 Physician Information and the Consumer's Demand for Care
The marginal health product of medical care gx is positive, the effect
on final health of Ho (or g2) is positive, and gx is larger the smaller the
value of Ho, or g12 < 0 (i.e., medical care benefits people more the
sicker they are). For simplicity, it is assumed that, given Ho, gx is a con-
stant, i.e., there is a constant marginal and average health product. If
the consumer knows with certainty that the value of Ho is Ho and the
value of gx for that Ho is gx, then his problem is to maximize (1) sub-
ject to
(2') H = H0 + g1-M
and
(3) Y = x + pM.
Given his endowment (Y,H0) and the shadow price of health, gx/p, the
consumer chooses the amount of health he wishes to buy.
The consumer might be uncertain either because he does not know
Ho or because he does not know gx for a given Ho. That is, he might be
uncertain either about what is wrong with him, which determines Ho, or
how effective medical care is in dealing with his condition, which deter-
mines gx. (In a more complex but realistic model, gx might depend not
just upon Ho, but upon the particular disease the person has. But for
simplicity I will continue to assume that conditions are only classified
by severity.)
The first case to be considered is that in which gx is uncertain but Ho
is known. Suppose gx (given Ho) has the (subjective) distribution f(gx).
The problem then is to maximize expected utility:
(4) EU = J U (x - pM, Ho + 8l M) f(gl) dgl
subject to constraint (3). Solution of this problem implies that M is
chosen so that Tnii' (g\) = ir}u' (g'x), where ^ and TJ are the probabili-
ties attached to two alternate values of gx- In effect, the consumer
chooses a level of M that would be somewhat appropriate for all pos-
sible states, but ideally appropriate for almost none.
Now assume that the consumer can obtain information on Ho or gx
from the physician. In order to explain how the consumer will respond
to any given information, it is necessary to explain how he judges the
accuracy (or diagnostic and prescriptive skill) of a physician. One way
the consumer can tell whether a physician is giving him accurate advice
is to observe the results of experiments. Those experiments would take
the following form: suppose gx is uncertain but Ho is known. Suppose a
physician asserts that the value of gx is gt. The consumer would then
observe whether H = Ho-\- gxM when he uses M units of care.
The result of a single such experiment will ordinarily not be conclu-
sive. H might differ from Ho -\- gxM for a number of reasons. For exam-46 Chapter Four
pie, the true production process might be H = Ho-\- gxM -\- u,E(u)
= 0, <T
2U > 0. Then additional observations on sample values of gi
would be needed to get an estimate of the population mean of (actual)
gi. Given some a priori distribution, the consumer can make an esti-
mate of the accuracy with which this physician predicts gi. A similar
argument holds for Ho. Note that the physician's motivation is irrelevant
here.
Suppose then a person is trying to determine whether or not he would
buy diagnostic information, and from which physician he would pur-
chase it. His "information about the accuracy of the information" will
be relevant. What will determine the amount of such information he
possesses? It is the number of experiments he has observed, or the price
of additional experiments. These "experiments" will represent his own
encounters with the physician, or those of his friends. Moreover, his
own skill in evaluating observed results may also affect his perceptions
of informational accuracy. Given his own and others' experiences, the
consumer can come to subjective estimates of the value of g1? and of
the accuracy of physician conjectures about the level of gx.
Now consider the effect of such estimates on the consumer's choices.
Suppose g
T! is the actual value of gx. Suppose the physician can deter-
mine g
Tx. Finally, suppose the person is given information by a physician
on what the value of gi is; this physician advice is represented by g^i,
and is not necessarily equal to g
Ti. If the person's prior distribution were
/(gi), his posterior distribution /(gi|g*i) is given by Bayes' rule as
where
In each case, the value of /(gi) is adjusted by the ratio of the condi-
tional to the unconditional distribution of /(g^i). We can immediately
distinguish two special cases. First, suppose the person knows the truth
with certainty. Consequently, the prior and posterior distributions are
the same. Information does not affect this person's demand for care
at all.
The alternative case is one in which the person puts complete confi-
dence in the physician's opinion, so that his posterior estimate of gi is
identical to what the physician tells him.
If physicians tell the truth (g*i = g
Ti), then M will be set at MT for
both kinds of persons. If physicians are not always accurate, then the
person who is certain of the truth still chooses MT, but the person who
believes the physician will choose some quantity other than MT. If per-
sons are of either of these two extreme types, an empirical measure that
distinguishes them permits one to make predictions about the possible47 Physician Information and the Consumer's Demand for Care
responsiveness of demand to physician information which has varying
degrees of accuracy.
Difficulties arise when either the a priori distribution or the likelihood
function are not of the degenerate forms discussed here. While it is easy
to show that the change in probability TT attached to same value of gi in
response to information, given some likelihood function, is smaller the
larger is |«- — 1/2|, it does not follow that the change in the preferred
level of M will be smaller. That depends on how the preferred M changes
with changes in TT. If M changes very rapidly with changes in TT for a -n in
excess of 1/2, then it is possible that information may make a bigger
difference in the use of such persons as compared to the use of more
"uncertain" persons, with TT closer to 1/2. One can say that the response
to new information of the individual's use of care is likely to be different
for persons with different prior beliefs or prior stocks of information.
But it does not appear that one can make any general a priori conjec-
tures about the direction of this relationship.
However, theoretical determinateness can be salvaged if the extremes
are considered. It can be said that one can find some -K sufficiently close
to 1 or zero that the effect on preferred M of the message g\ = g*\ is
smaller than the effect of that message on use at any n further away from
these extremes. Since the effect of any change in TT on M must be finite,
if we can find some A^ (as a result of receiving information) that is
sufficiently small, we can get as small an effect on M as we want. All we
need to show is that, in the neighborhood of TT = 1, we can find a TT such
that A7r as a result of the message ji = ^ is as small as we want. Con-
sider some value of TT = (1 — e). Since the physician's advice has no
effect when IT = 1, by continuity it follows that, by selecting some value
of e sufficiently small, we can make /(#i|g^i ^ g
Ti) as close to f(gi) as
we want for any given likelihood function.
4 That is, we can make the
posterior probability as close to the prior probability as we want, even
if the physician provides incorrect information.
This discussion of the effect of information on use suggests that, how-
ever indeterminate the relationship in general, one can find sufficiently
extreme values of information and ignorance such that the informed are
less responsive to information than the ignorant. This proposition will
be the basis of the empirical analysis.
A Censoring Problem
This proposition applies only if the set of conditions for which in-
formed and uninformed persons receive physician advice is the same.
Such an assumption may not be plausible in general. One problem is
that the incidence of conditions may differ according to the level of in-
formation, but this problem is not likely to be serious. A more serious48 Chapter Four
problem arises from a kind of censoring. The person who is virtually
certain of the truth will ignore erroneous physician advice, as described
in the preceding section. But he will also have no incentive to seek that
advice in the first place. Those persons in the "well-informed" set who
actually meet with physicians will tend to be precisely those whose be-
havior is easier to change; the unresponsive persons will have been
"censored" out initially, independent of the eventual content of physi-
cian advice. Those persons classified as poorly informed who seek advice
may therefore be no more responsive than those persons classified as
well informed who seek advice.
This difficulty will not be important if persons who seek medical
therapy usually must first see a physician and get his advice (or at least
his diagnosis), whether they demand that advice or not. Suppose, for
example, a child in a well-informed family has tonsilitis. The parents
know that tonsillectomy is not warranted for his condition. Nevertheless,
they must go through a physician in order to obtain a prescription for
antibiotics, and are therefore potentially exposed to the content of physi-
cian advice.
It seems reasonable to suppose that many conditions for which de-
mand creation is likely are of this sort; at least one physician contact is
often needed for therapy, no matter what the state of patient informa-
tion. As long as those persons in the well-informed set who really do
seek advice (i.e., are not virtually certain) are not more responsive than
those in the less well-informed set, the elasticity, and probably the mag-
nitude, of the response of the well-informed who use positive amounts
of care will be smaller than that of the less well-informed. This occurs
because the well-informed set will include some persons who really are
virtually certain, but are compelled to go through at least one physician
in order to obtain any care at all. That is, as long as some of those
persons who are truly well-informed are persons who seek care (even
if they do not seek advice), the overall response of persons in the well-
informed set will be smaller, other things being equal.
The Level of Accuracy, the Demand for
Care, and Physician Availability
The empirical finding for which we seek a theoretical framework is
that, ceteris paribus, the demand curve for physicians' services appears
to shift when the stock of physicians per capita changes, because accu-
racy of physician advice decreases. The purpose of this section is to
construct models which are consistent with a negative relationship be-
tween physicians per capita and accuracy. It is not my intent to argue
that a negative relationship must hold. A model is useful if it permits a49 Physician Information and the Consumer's Demand for Care
negative relationship to hold; as will be shown, certain otherwise attrac-
tive and plausible models do not permit a negative relationship to occur,
and so those models must be discarded.
For the purpose of distinguishing among models, the classification in
chapter 1 is useful. To begin with, there is no point in discussing com-
petitive market clearing models. If the seller takes price as given and
supposes that he can sell as much as he wants at that price, there is no
reason for him to alter accuracy in order to sell more. Consequently,
the discussion will primarily be concerned with noncompetitive models.
Model 1: The Physician as a Real-income
Maximizing Monopolist
The usual assumption in studies of labor supply is that the agents
have two arguments in their utility functions: money income and leisure.
In order to simplify the exposition, it will be assumed that physician
time is available at a constant opportunity cost. This assumption avoids
the necessity of including leisure in the utility function, and makes maxi-
mization of utility equivalent to maximization of the difference between
total revenue and total opportunity costs, including the opportunity cost
of leisure foregone.
The physician may be thought of as selling two products: diagnostic
information and therapeutic care. These markets are not separate. The
amount of information about a product that consumers will want to buy
will depend upon both the price of information and the price of the
product, in this case therapeutic care. Likewise, the amount of thera-
peutic care that a person will eventually buy at a given price will depend
upon the price of information. Although the quantity of each type of
care demanded is inversely related to its own price, it is not possible to
establish definitive comparative statics results for the cross-price effects.
The problem is further complicated in practice by the nonmarginal na-
ture of many information purchases. Often in order to receive any thera-
peutic care at all the individual is required to seek diagnosis; in principle
the price of diagnostic information could absorb all of the consumers'
surplus from therapeutic care.
But the concern here is not primarily with these price and quantity
effects. Rather, we wish to determine the accuracy or the content of a
given amount of information purchased. Assume initially that the accu-
racy of the diagnosis does not affect a physician's information demand
curve. Holding other things constant, including leisure time and the
physician time devoted to diagnosis and therapeutic care, the real-income
maximizing physician will then adjust the level of accuracy A to that
level at which the increase in his net income from changing accuracy50 Chapter Four
is zero. This conclusion implies that, for any quantity of therapeutic
care demanded, accuracy is set at that level which maximizes the unit
price paid.
If total demand for therapeutic care QD is given by QD = Q(P,A),
where P is the user price of care and A is the level of accuracy among
a set of identical physicians, then the individual physician demand Q
lD,
assuming pro-rata sharing among N identical physicians, is <2*D = 1/N
QD(P, A). The individual physician demand curve when A is set at the
level of true information, or AT, is shown in figure 4.1 as D
lT = 1/N
QD(P,AT). But the maximizing physician will not choose to confront
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maximizes price at every quantity. This choice yields a maximum curve,
£)*„„„.= \/N QD(P,Amax), where Amax is the level of accuracy which
maximizes P at every QD. He will then choose the profit-maximizing
level of P given this curve.
The effect of increasing the supply of physicians can be thought of as
a pro-rata decrease in the demand facing each physician. (It might also
change the extent of competitiveness, but that will be ignored here.) The
Z)*mM curve will shift to D
irmaa;, the result being smaller output per physi-
cian at any price, and probably a lower price. However, this change will
not necessarily affect the level of accuracy, and it will have no effect on
the market demand curve D
lmax. That level of accuracy which maximizes
price at a given quantity demanded from a particular seller also maxi-
mizes price at any pro-rata share of that quantity. There would, in this
situation, be no detectable availability effect resulting from an increase
in the number of physicians (even though demand is, of course, different
from DT). Quantity demanded would rise as price falls along the D
imax
demand curve, but this would be wholly captured in an accurate measure
of user price. Any observed availability effect must be due to changes in
nonmonetary rationing. If we are to postulate a measurable availability
effect arising from information, we must enlarge the set of arguments in
the physician's utility function.
Model 2: The Physician as a Partially Benevolent Oligopolist
In this section we shall consider a model of demand creation among
physicians who take price as given but do not expect to be able to sell
unlimited amounts at that price. In addition to being realistic, especially
for situations in which third parties set fee levels, this model permits us
to throw into sharp focus the physician's incentive to alter accuracy.
It may not be unreasonable to assume that alterations in accuracy
operate mainly on quantity, not price, at least as far as the individual
physician is concerned. Oligopolistic features of the industry may lead
to a reluctance to raise price, as may a kind of altruism that recognizes
that higher prices give no benefit to consumers, while higher quantities
may provide some benefit to both consumers and physicians.
It is assumed that physicians are partially benevolent, in the sense that
the physician's maximand also includes a measure of accuracy. Other
things being equal, physicians would rather tell the truth, but they would
be willing to surrender some accuracy for some amount of money in-
come. The physician obtains utility from real income Y, which is total
revenue minus total opportunity costs, and from accuracy A. Both real
income and accuracy are normal goods.
With P fixed, the physician who does not get utility from accuracy
will choose that level of accuracy at which the quantity demanded from52 Chapter Four
him equals or gets as close as possible (given demand) to that quantity
at which price equals "marginal cost," where the latter includes the
value of sacrificed leisure. However, when accuracy yields utility, the
level of accuracy is the one which satisfies
(5)
U,
where C is total opportunity cost, including the opportunity cost of phy-
sician time, and UA and UY are the marginal utilities of accuracy and
income respectively.
These effects are shown in figure 4.2. Suppose price is initially at P,
and "MC" measures both money marginal cost and the money value of
sacrificed leisure. At any P, income would obviously be maximized by
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demand curve, whichever is less. If P = P, for example, Q would be set
at Q. But if the physician values accuracy, he may not be willing to ex-
pand Q (and reduce A) to this level. He may instead set accuracy at
the level given by equation (5), and consequently set Q at, say, Q* less
than Q.
Now let the number of physicians be increased. Each physician's Q
will fall below Q*, say to Q', if A stays at its initial level. At this point,
the physician's income is less so he may be willing to sacrifice some
accuracy to recoup part of the loss in income. (Ordinarily he would not
wish to reduce accuracy so much as to restore his original level of in-
come.) Moreover, at Q', there will also be a bigger gain from increasing
Q by one unit, since P — "MC is greater. If BQ/dA is constant or
increases as Q decreases, then the net return from changing A will also
have increased.
As with most oligopoly models, this model does not make specific
predictions about the equilibrium level of price. It is likely that price
would decline below P, though by how much, and to what extent the
decline would be related to physicians per capita, is impossible to say.
But whatever the final price, at that price there would generally be some
incentive to create demand. Moreover, the incentive to create demand
would generally be greater at a given price the larger the number of
physicians.
There would, however, be no incentive to create demand if the price
settled to PT or below. Note that if P equals PT, a physician, even an
income-maximizing one, would tell the truth; an incentive to create
demand requires excess supply at PT- This is an important result, and
it will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Note also that
PT falls as physician stock increases.
If price is given but is initially below Pmax, then use will increase with
physician stock even if physicians only value income, not accuracy. In
effect, use is constrained by supply, and follows the outward-shifting
aggregate supply curve. The more elastic supply is, the less likely that
price is below Pmax- For example, if there are constant returns to scale
in the supply of some type of physician service, the quantity given by
the Dmax demand curve will be supplied for any price in excess of aver-
age cost, and no availability effect will be observed.
Figure 4.2 also indicates that, given the number of physicians, the
extent of demand creation will vary positively with the price, unless in-
come effects are very strong. The reward from creating demand, or
P — MC, is obviously larger at any Q the higher P is. Of course, income
will also be higher if P is higher, and this "income effect" may to some
extent offset the "substitution effect" in the direction of reduced accu-
racy.54 Chapter Four
Model 3: The Physician as a Partially Benevolent Monopolist
If the physician has some control over price, it is still true that in
equilibrium the marginal effect of changes in accuracy on his income
must compensate him for the disutility of reduced accuracy. The effect
that changes in accuracy have on the level of income depends upon how
the demand curve is shifted when A changes. Whatever price is finally
charged, the marginal condition (5) must obviously still be satisfied. In
addition, the usual MR = MC condition, given the level of accuracy,
must hold as well. By the same arguments as in the preceding section,
the level of accuracy will decrease with the physician stock at any given
level of price if 'dQ/'dA is constant or increases with decreases in Q.
Consequently, one would expect to observe an availability effect on
consumer demands.
This appears to be the only unambiguous prediction one can obtain
from "demand-creation" models. As Feldman and Sloan
5 have shown,
and as Reinhardt
6 has emphasized, literally any relationship between
equilibrium market price and physician stock is consistent with such
models. Depending upon how the demand curve pivots when it shifts,
the new equilibrium price could be above, equal, or below the price that
prevailed with a smaller stock of physicians.
This result has led both Evans
7 and Reinhardt to conclude that it is
not possible to refute the demand creation hypothesis by looking at the
relationship between physician stock and price. The most that such an
investigation could do is to cast doubts on the neoclassical competitive
hypothesis of no demand creation. Even this weak conclusion is really
not very useful. If the market is monopolistic rather than competitive,
and individual physician demand curves become less elastic as the phy-
sician stock rises, then price can vary directly with that stock even in a
neoclassical, income-maximizing, but noncompetitive world. While one
usually does not assume that firm demand curves become less elastic
when more competitors enter, Satterthwaite
8 has recently shown that the
effect of numbers of sellers on information about prices or quality levels
of providers can lead to such a result without having consumers pushed
off their "true" demand curve by changes in accuracy. Moreover, Pauly
and Satterthwaite
9 have found that variation in the level of prices across
cities can be explained without recourse to the modified target income
model.
The relationship between price and availability will therefore not
settle the question of the availability effect, but a study of the relation-
ship between availability and use, given price, and between price and
use, given availability, will provide some answers. These answers will
be valid even if prices are not fixed, as long as price is exogenous to the55 Physician Information and the Consumer's Demand for Care
individual demander. It is precisely this kind of test that will be pre-
sented in the next chapter.
Information about Information
Up to this point, we have taken the consumer's estimate of the accu-
racy of physician advice as depending only on the total number of
experiments or experiences he has observed. We have also assumed that
the consumer does not change physicians in response to the content of
information provided by the physician; the consumer's only decision is
whether to follow that advice or not. But consumers may well perceive
differences among physicians with regard to the accuracy of their advice,
and act on those perceptions in choosing which physician to patronize.
In other words, the individual physician firm's demand curves for its
output of advice and for its output of therapeutic care may increase if it
is perceived to give more accurate advice. Such a response may provide
an incentive to the physician to offer accurate advice; it constrains his
ability to generate net increases in demand. In terms of the geometric
presentation, competition may affect the position of the D
imax curve;
whether or not it actually pushes the curve in as far as D
lT, competition
may still affect the observed level of accuracy.
We now need to ask how competition, as measured by the number of
physicians (in total or per capita), affects the equilibrium level of accu-
racy. While a complete characterization of this kind of equilibrium with
information and goods as joint products has not yet been fully devel-
oped, the following simple model possesses what appear to be critical
insights.
Suppose a market area has N identical patients (customers) and M
identical physicians (sellers). Suppose that the selling price of thera-
peutic care is fixed at P, which is above "MC" at the output of thera-
peutic care demanded when the truth is told. Suppose profits are only
earned on therapeutic care. At any level of accuracy A, let demand per
NO
patient be Q(A); demand per physician is —r-r. Suppose that each physi-
cian takes other physicians' levels of accuracy as given. Finally, suppose
that any one physician expects that, if all other physicians maintain
their (identical) levels of accuracy, and he raises his, he will obtain
some fraction k of all other physicians' customers.
Given some initial level of accuracy, a physician's income will then
be increased by increases in his level of accuracy if
M
 (M
 l)>dAM56 Chapter Four
The term on the left is the gain to the physician of k percent of the
(~TF) services provided by each of the M— 1 other physicians. The
term on the right is the loss to the physician resulting from less demand
among his current set of customers. Simplification of the inequality
indicates that an increase in accuracy will increase income if kQ (M — 1)
> dQ/dA.
If k and dQ/dA are assumed to be constant, the expression obvi-
ously implies that accuracy will tend to increase as the number of physi-
cians (or competitors) increases. But while there is no obvious reason
why 8Q/8A should change as M changes, there are some reasons why
k might vary with M. On the one hand, standard search models would
suggest that, if accuracy can be measured with certainty by just one
search, k would be likely to increase with M. The more sellers, the lower
the average cost to the consumer of getting an "accuracy quotation"
from another seller, and consequently the more attractive will be a
higher accuracy seller. There is a second possibility, however, if the
level of accuracy is not measured perfectly. Given some total number
of experiments or experiences, the consumer's estimate of the accuracy
of a particular physician's diagnosis will be likely to depend on the total
number of physicians in his market area. The more physicians, the lower
the average number of experiences the consumer or his friends are likely
to have had with any given physician, and hence the less precisely he
can estimate the quality or accuracy of any individual physician's diag-
nosis. If there is only one physician in town, all of the consumer's past
experience will have been with that physician. If there are hundreds of
physicians, the average accuracy of his estimate will be less (although
he could have a very accurate estimate of the diagnostic capability of
any individual physician). If the consumer is risk averse, or if he has
difficulty remembering the identities of multiple sellers, he may be less
willing to leave his present seller (whose accuracy he probably knows
fairly well) for another physician whose accuracy he can estimate only
imperfectly. To take two extremes: in a town with only a few physicians,
differential levels of accuracy will quickly become well known. But in
a large metropolitan area, it may be very difficult to find several friends
who use the same physician, so that it will be impossible to get an accu-
rate measure of the level of accuracy of any alternative seller. Conse-
quently, it is possible that k will tend to be larger in small towns than
in large metropolitan areas; k may well decrease as the number of physi-
cians increases.
An availability effect will be nonexistent, or small and difficult to
detect, if Dmax is close to DT. What do the observations above imply
about measurement of the availability effect? They suggest that the posi-
tion of the Dmax demand curve is likely to vary with the number of phy-57 Physician Information and the Consumer's Demand for Care
sicians (not physicians per capita) in the market area. The relationship
between number of physicians and Dmax cannot, however, be predicted
a priori: Dmax can increase, decrease, or remain constant as M changes.
The relationship depends upon the sign and magnitude of the rate of
change in k with respect to M. Moreover, precise measurement of the
extent of market area is probably impossible, although there have been
some fairly successful attempts to use proxy measures.
1
0 It does seem
possible, nevertheless, to characterize extreme cases. In rural areas, at
one extreme, the level of consumer information is likely to be fairly high,
so it is possible that Dmax will be fairly close to DT—little or no avail-
ability effect will be observed, because it will not pay physicians to re-
duce their level of accuracy when some consumers are able to detect
the reduction.
1
1 In large metropolitan areas, at the other extreme, it is
likely that k will be low, possibly near zero, because few of the con-
sumer's friends are likely to be able to provide information on the same
physician's accuracy. Consequently, Dmax will lie far to the right of DT,
and the "standard" availability effect analysis developed above will
apply.
While these statements are obviously highly conjectural, they do sug-
gest that, in the absence of accurate measures of the number of sellers
in the consumers' market area, it may be desirable to estimate separate
availability effects for rural areas, large metropolitan areas, and other
areas. Such a procedure is followed in the empirical work described in
the next chapter.
Incentives Under a Fee-for-service System
Before going on to discuss the outcomes produced by the physician
incentives present in the existing fee-for-service system, I will digress to
examine fee-for-service under alternative fee schedules. The goal here
is to see whether there is something inherent in the fee-for-service con-
cept which leads to departures from accurate advice. One of the results
from the analysis earlier in this chapter that deserves special emphasis
is the following: if the physician's notional supply curve intersects that
consumer's demand curve which corresponds to true and accurate infor-
mation, then the price at which this intersection occurs is a price which
will induce the physician to tell the truth, and act as the consumer's
agent. In this section I wish to expand on this notion, to extend it to a
model in which there are multiple kinds of outputs supplied by the
physician, and to use it to analyze the possible superiority of prepaid
group practice or Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) over fee-
for-service medicine.
With respect to the choice among competing methods of treating a
given illness, it is often argued that the fee-for-service physician has an58 Chapter Four
incentive not to provide true information and not to recommend to the
patient the utility-maximizing course of treatment. In particular, the fee-
for-service physician, it is argued, will provide too much care as well as
unnecessarily expensive forms of care.
1
2 I explored the issues of cost-
minimization for a given level of health in chapter 1, and I argued that
(1) the income-maximizing physician may give distorted advice on the
level of health to be achieved and (2) if fees are not free to vary, the
mix of treatments may not be the one which minimizes the cost of what-
ever level of health is produced. Here I shall examine the possibility
of choosing a schedule of fees to minimize both kinds of distortion.
With respect to fee-for-service versus HMOs, there has been much
discussion of the apparent fact that the fee-for-service system of payment
tends to encourage additional use of medical care, especially hospitaliza-
tion, as compared to capitation-salary schemes. Often this finding is
extended to a comparison of fee-for-service in general with capitation
in general, and often, too, it is argued that the additional use is unneces-
sary in some normative sense. What I wish to suggest here, however, is
that these characteristics of the present fee-for-service system are not,
in themselves, evidence against the concept of paying for medical care
(or any other good) on a fee-for-service basis. If there are failings in
the present system, they may stem not from the fee-for-service system
as such, but primarily from the present level of actual fees. A possible
misallocation of manpower is a secondary (and related) cause. It is not
fee-for-service as a concept that is faulty, but rather some changeable
characteristics of the present fee-for-service system. It is therefore wrong-
headed to argue for a general preference for capitation or salary as op-
posed to fee-for-service.
In fact, it is possible to establish a stronger result: not only can
fee-for-service be made as "good" as capitation, from a theoretical view-
point, it can be better than any feasible form of capitation. Put another
way, there exists some set of fees for specific services which will achieve
a pattern of incentives for physicians that, at worst, provides him no
incentive to depart from an agency role. Any preference for patient
welfare, however slight, would then be sufficient to cause him to act as
a perfect agent. These theoretical considerations do not, of course, bear
directly on the question of the merits of existing systems, since each may
be at different places in the best-worst continuum. They do suggest,
however, that even if the present fee-for-service system is not perfect,
it is at least perfectible. Accordingly, I shall go on to consider (1) why
the present system might not have achieved the ideal pattern of fees and
(2) what alterations might improve matters.
Initially, I will assume that the prices (fees) received by physicians
are given. This assumption is useful analytically, and may not be too
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hours physicians will work is given, and suppose physician utility de-
pends on income received and patient well-being. (Physicians do not
prefer to do some tasks more than others.) The concern for patient
well-being can be very small, in the sense that the physician would be
willing to sacrifice a great deal of patient well-being for a very small
increase in income. All that is required is that, given a set of actions
which yields equal money income, the physician will choose that course
of action which most benefits his patients. The question now is: What is
the set of prices for individual services the physician prescribes which
will cause him to behave in a way which maximizes patient welfare?
The intuitive basis for the answer to this question is clear: if the
physician makes the same amount of income no matter how he spends
his time with patients, he might as well choose the way which most
benefits his patients. That is, a set of prices which equalizes physician
net income per hour worked will permit physician utility maximization
and patient welfare maximization to coincide.
1
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There is still the question of how total physician hours worked are
determined. If physician utility depends on income and leisure, and the
other usual conditions are satisfied, then there will be a supply curve of
total hours worked for each physician. Given the number of physicians
in practice, there will be some overall level of net income per hour
worked which will maximize patient welfare.
Contrast the pattern of output which physicians would want to supply
under this scheme with that under a scheme in which net income per
hour is not equalized. The income-maximizing physician will choose to
produce that type of output which yields the highest returns per hour
worked. If there were no other constraints, this would be the only type
of output he would produce. But there may be limits on the amount of
this type of output he can persuade people to take. Then he may pro-
duce the next most profitable output, or he may even produce some
complementary lower-yield outputs (e.g., initial office visits) in order
to be able to persuade consumers to take the higher yield output.
If the production process for each output displays constant returns to
scale, then the level of net income from any output will depend on the
price of output and the price of inputs, but not on the particular amount
of output. If there are increasing costs for a given output, price can be
used to select any particular quantity or mix of output. In the first case,
the most that can be accomplished is what might be called "incentive
neutrality": the physician would be indifferent toward producing the
ideal mix of output and some other combination of those outputs which
are to be produced in positive quantities. However, if the physician has
the slightest preference for doing what is in the patient's best interest,
or if there is the slightest chance that he will lose patients in whose
interests he does not act, then he will behave as a perfect agent. In the60 Chapter Four
second case, the total quantity of each type of output produced by each
physician is determined by the price, but not the mix provided to each
patient. Again, a slight degree of concern for patient welfare or a slight
extent of competition is all that is needed for the optimal outcome to be
an equilibrium outcome.
Compare these ideal price incentives to those under a capitation
(HMO) system. Total revenue is fixed, so real income maximization
provides incentives to minimize total inputs, whether physician or non-
physician. For the income-maximizing (or cost-minimizing HMO), there
are incentives to provide a small amount of total output, even when that
would not be in the patient's own interests, and to select cheaper mixes
of outputs. Competition may constrain the ability to underprovide some-
what, but it is unlikely that it will be perfect enough to prevent it en-
tirely. This is not to say that an HMO equilibrium may not be preferable
to existing fee-for-service prices. However, there exists a set of fee-for-
service prices, not necessarily existing ones, which can always do as well
or better, in terms of providing incentives for agency, than any capita-
tion scheme. For a capitation scheme to achieve even as good an out-
come as fee-for-service, perfect competition is required. Perfect compe-
tition is not required under the ideal set of fees-for-service.
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Comparisons between existing fee-for-service and HMO systems are
made difficult because of an ambiguity in the notion of agency, which
has been noted above. With insurance that is not individually experience
rated, the individual patient is best off by using care as long as the value
he places on the care exceeds the user cost he pays. Since all patients
must pay collectively the full cost of care, all may be better off if they
keep use below this level. But which of the two levels of output is the
one the physician should choose in his role as agent? One of the advan-
tages of the HMO may be precisely that it does cause the physician to
behave not as the agent of his own patients, or of the fraction of the
membership he treats, but rather as agent for the entire membership
group.
Can this same kind of "group agency" be attained under fee-for-
service? If the physician does completely control what happens to the
patient, there is still some set of fees that can be found to induce him to
supply exactly what he would supply if he were acting as agent for all
patients. There is a stronger result, however. Given such a set of prices,
the physician will provide this ideal amount of output to patients regard-
less of what individual patients do. Patients may want their physician
to provide more output, but income-maximizing physicians will refuse
to do so. Rather than levying user charges—copayments or deductibles
—to discourage moral hazard, there is a scheme of reimbursement un-
der fee-for-service that will have exactly the same effect as long as
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being of their patients. If the fee structure is incentive neutral, physi-
cians may even take differences in patient preferences into account to
some extent, since doing so will improve patient well-being.
This abstract discussion can be illustrated with some examples. Con-
sider those commonly cited examples of "overprovision" under fee-for-
service: surgery and hospitalization in general. The physician's net
income per hour worked is likely to be greater if he performs surgery
than if he does not. It is therefore not surprising that there may be
"excessive surgery" under fee-for-service, or that this rate can be re-
duced by capitation. What is not generally recognized, however, is that
with a sufficiently low relative fee for surgery, this incentive could also
be made to disappear. The emphasis here is on relative fees; an alterna-
tive to cutting fees for performing surgery would be to raise the fee for
other procedures, such as consultation.
A second way of reducing marginal net real income (MNRI) is to
raise opportunity costs; in addition to taxing the use of inputs, this could
be done by increasing the number of hours worked per physician. Fewer
surgeons should lead to incentives to perform less surgery, because the
opportunity cost of each surgeon's time—the value of lost leisure—will
be greater if he has less leisure. It is interesting to note that HMOs
typically follow both of these strategies: they pay salaries or profit
shares, which may imply zero or negative real net income from addi-
tional surgery, and they hire fewer surgeons relative to population
served.
If a physician hospitalizes a patient for treatment of a given condition,
he usually benefits in three ways: (1) he may be able to charge (and
have insurance cover) a higher fee for procedures performed in hospital;
(2) it may take less of his time to see patients in the hospital rather
than in the office or at home, and yet his fee for a follow-up visit may
be the same or greater; (3) as indicated in chapter 3, he may be able
to substitute insured hospital inputs for uninsured inputs which he would
provide. All of these reasons lead to a higher MNRI from hospitaliza-
tion. The cure, again, is some reduction in MNRI—paying the same for
a procedure regardless of where performed (or even possibly less if the
procedure is performed in the hospital), paying less for visits which take
less time, and perhaps some method of charging the physician for addi-
tional hospital inputs.
1
5 Where the user price of hospital treatment is
below that of ambulatory treatment because the insurance only covers
inpatient expenses, then the patient will still have an incentive to seek
overprovision, even if physician incentives are rationalized. In such a
case, as noted above, the notion of agency is ambiguous, and conflict
between physician and patient may arise. Here moral hazard cannot be
controlled directly. But at least for those outputs equally covered by
insurance, restructuring of fees to yield, on average, approximately62 Chapter Four
equal MNRI might go a long way toward reducing some of the abuses
under fee-for-service.
Why Are Fees Out of Line?
In order for such a policy suggestion to succeed, one needs to have
some idea of the forces which lead to the initial pattern of fees. Why
are the MNRI per hour different for different outputs? One would have
expected that the return to any input in different uses would tend to be
equalized. Suppliers would devote time to the higher-yielding output,
causing its price to fall and the price of other outputs to rise. Why hasn't
this happened?
For those outputs whose physician fees are covered by insurance, it is
easy to see why prices do not fall. Cutting price would not increase a
surgeon's volume of business, even if he wanted to produce more out-
put. This would still not prevent equalization if there were an unlimited
amount of insured business. But there clearly is not enough surgery to
permit all physicians who are licensed to perform it to do so.
Why do insurance plans not permit the fees they pay to fall? Perhaps
it is because some physician insurances are provided by physician-
dominated firms. To provide a complete explanation here would take
us far from the main line of our argument. The only purpose here is to
point out that insurance fee schedules may be the ultimate cause of over-
provision of many physician services.
At a policy level, there are three broad strategies for remedying over-
provision under fee-for-service. MNRI can be reduced either by cutting
price or by raising unit cost. A cut in fees paid by third parties would
accomplish the former, while a reduction in the number of physicians
in specialties in which there is too much output would accomplish the
latter. A third strategy involves making the demand for physician ser-
vices used to produce insured outputs more elastic. Payment of indem-
nities, for example, makes price cutting pay, and so may lead to lower
prices.
In summary, it is not fee-for-service as such that yields incentives for
overprovision; rather, it is the level of existing fees for some procedures.
Change the fees, either by lowering some or by raising others, and the
overprovision will disappear. An additional corrective is that the total
stock of physician input must be efficiently utilized; otherwise the spe-
cific examples of overuse we now see may be converted to a general
problem of overuse of all physicians' services. Somewhat surprisingly,
writers on the subject of incentives have generally ignored the flexibility
available under a fee-for-service system. Monsma has given perhaps the
most extensive treatment of the effect of what he calls "marginal reve-
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exploring the possibility of how the MNRI under fee-for-service might
be reduced.
1
6 He correctly says that, since marginal gross revenue is
zero under capitation, MNRI there must be lower than under fees which
yield positive MNRI. This yields the prediction that output should be
less under capitation, but it does not answer the objection that output
under capitation may be too low. In the absence of perfect competition,
fee-for-service payment can still provide ideal incentives.
Changing the Fee Structure
There are two related objections to the notion that fee-for-service,
with radically restructured fees, could be used to provide optimal incen-
tives. It may be argued that the changes in fees may be so large as to
(1) be infeasible or (2) if feasible, impractical because of the large
reductions in some specialists' incomes they imply. For example, given
the current level of MNRI for surgery, equalizing returns from surgery
and consultation would probably imply enormous fees for consultation
—perhaps $200 for a half-hour visit. Up to a point, this change might
result not in less surgery, but just more consultation, if excess surgical
capacity is sufficiently large. Conversely, cutting surgical fees to equalize
MNRI might involve hefty cuts. Even if these were feasible, the conse-
quent reduction in surgeons' incomes might, again up to a point, induce
them to desire to do more, rather than less surgery than at present in
order to keep their incomes up to their accustomed levels. A still fur-
ther reduction in fees could reduce this incentive, but at the cost of a still
less palatable reduction in income.
There are two kinds of responses to these objections. One is to note
that they only represent the obvious consequences of erroneous man-
power policy. Paying surgeons to do consultation may look expensive,
but it may be less costly than having them use their time performing
surgery, given that too many surgical specialists have been trained. The
second is to note that in the long run, "appropriate" levels of physician-
specialist incomes can be combined with "appropriate" incentives only
if "appropriate" numbers of specialists are trained. In the interim, one
might be able to obtain consent to a substantial reduction in fees by
proposing to supplement fees with lump-sum payments to those physi-
cians in specialties thought to be in excess supply. In order to get from
a "wrong" fee-for-service system to a proper system, it may be necessary
to use partial salary-capitation reimbursement for a time, but always as
a supplement to a fee-for-service system.